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Abstract—One of the main challenges in the emerging smart
grid is the integration of renewable energy resources (RER).
The latter introduces both intermittency and uncertainty into
the grid, both of which can affect the underlying energy market.
An interesting concept that is being explored for mitigating the
integration cost of RERs is Demand Response. Implemented as
a time-varying electricity price in real-time, Demand Response
has a direct impact on the underlying energy market as well.
Beginning with an overall model of the major market participants
together with the constraints of transmission and generation, we
analyze the energy market in this paper and derive conditions
for global maximum using standard KKT criteria. The effect
of uncertainties in the RER on the market equilibrium is then
quantified, with and without real-time pricing. Perturbation
analysis methods are used to compare the equilibria in the
nominal and perturbed markets. These markets are also analyzed
using a game-theoretic point of view. Sufficient conditions are
derived for the existence of a unique Pure Nash Equilibrium in
the nominal market. The perturbed market is analyzed using the
concept of closeness of two strategic games and the equilibria
of close games. This analysis is used to quantify the effect of
uncertainty of RERs and its possible mitigation using Demand
Response. Finally numerical studies are reported using an IEEE
30-bus to validate the theoretical results.
NOMENCLATURE
θn Set of indices of generating units at node n
ϑn Set of indices of demands at node n
Ωn Set of indices of nodes connected to node n
Dq Set of indices of Consumers {1, 2, . . . , ND}
Gf Set of indices of generating units {1, 2, . . . , NG}
Gw Set of indices of renewable generating units
{1, 2, . . . , NW }
N Number of all buses
ND Number of demands
Nt Number of transmission lines
NG Number of generating units
NDj Number of blocks demanded by demand j
NGi Number of blocks bid by generating unit i
NGl Number of blocks bid by renewable generating unit l
γnm Dual variable associated with the transmission capac-
ity constraint of line n−m
ψjk Dual variable associated with the maximum capacity
limit for block k of demand j
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ρn Locational marginal price corresponding to the gen-
erating unit i or the demand j that is located at node
n
αi Dual variable associated with the maximum capacity
constraint of generating unit i
φib Dual variable associated with the maximum capacity
limit for block b of generating unit i
σj Dual variable associated with the minimum demand
constraint of demand j
λUDjk Marginal utility associated with block k of demand j
λBDjk Price bid by demand j to buy power block k
λBGib Price bid by generating unit i to sell power block b
λCGib Marginal operating cost associated with block b of
generator i
PmaxDjk Maximum power demanded in block k of demand j
PminDjk Minimum power supplied to the demand j
PDjk Power block k that the demand j is consuming
PGib Power block b that the generating unit i is producing
PmaxGib Maximum power output in block b of generating unit
i
PmaxGi Maximum power output of generating unit i
PminGi Minimum power output of generating unit i
PwGlb Power block b that the renewable generating unit l is
producing
PwGlbmax Maximum wind power estimation for block b of
renewable generating unit l
PwGlbmin Minimum wind power estimation for block b of
renewable generating unit l
P¯wGlbmin Mean wind power for block b of renewable generat-
ing unit l
Pmaxnm Transmission capacity limit of line n−m
∆ρn(j) Change of LMP for demand j
∆PDjk Change of consumption by demand j
∆Gib Uncertainty in block b of wind generating unit i
κDjk Curtailment Factor of block k by demand j
δn voltage angle of bus n
Bnm susceptance of line n−m
I. INTRODUCTION
The goal in a Smart Grid is to integrate large-scale renew-
able generation and emerging storage technologies, control
signals to loads to match supply, and dramatically improve
energy efficiency. Electricity markets, the entity that carries out
power balance by scheduling power using bids from various
generating companies, are crucial components that can con-
tribute to an efficient smart grid. Electricity market models that
accurately represent the market dynamics are exceedingly im-
portant. These models must capture the behavior of the dom-
inant market players such as generators, consumers, and ISO,
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market mechanisms such as gaming behaviors (ex. bidding
strategies), real-time prices via Demand Response, diverse
dynamic drivers (e.g., weather, load, fuel prices, and wind
supply), and physical constraints (e.g., ramping, transmission
congestion) [1]. These market models and analysis of the
market equilibrium directly help to identify various sources of
price volatility and dependence and sensitivity to uncertainties
and intermittencies in renewable energy sources and variations
in real-time prices due to Demand Response. Our focus in
this paper is on an electricity market model that captures the
dynamics of market players, physical constraints, perturbations
in renewable energy resources (RER), and variations due to
demand response.
Various methods have been proposed in the literature to
determine market models [10], [11], [15]. Given the primary
purpose of market balance, these methods are primarily fo-
cused on the analysis of market equilibrium. Methods in [10],
[11] model the electricity market participants subject to spot
market equilibrium and their own constraints, leading to a
method termed Equilibrium Programming with Equilibrium
Constraints (EPECs). In such models, each agent solves a
Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC)
[15], and by using stationarity theory for MPECs a standard
mixed complementarity problem (CP) is shown to lead to
equilibrium [16].
Another approach to market modeling employs a varia-
tional and complementarity Problem (CP) formulation (see
[17], [18], [52], [19]) which models the equilibrium of the
electricity market where forward and spot decisions are made
simultaneously. These models may also be specified by the
ISOs objective, maximization of social welfare [10], [11] or
maximization of wheeling or transmission revenue [17], [19].
A single-settlement framework based on a linear complemen-
tarity problem (LCP) is proposed in [14], which leads to a
strategic game in which players have coupled constraints and
the equilibrium properties are analyzed. Yet another approach
used for electricity markets is the use of Cournot models.
Here, the strategies of the generator companies are allowed
to depend on other market participants, who also act so as
to maximize their own profits. This in turn allows a more
transparent dependence of costs of generators and consumers
profit on the market equilibrium (see [20], [21], [52], [22],
[23], [24], [1], [4], [3], [5]).
In the context of a market for smart grid, the question that
needs to be addressed is how the effect of RERs can be best
captured in a market model. The integration of RER poses the
challenge of intermittency and uncertainty, both of which in
turn can affect the economic planning and operation of the
overall power system. The uncertainties can impose costs due
to the limited-dispatchability of intermittent generation [31],
the variability in resource availability, and errors in forecasting
resource availability and loads [34], [35], [36]. There is a
considerable literature covering many important aspects of
wind power ranging from comprehensive integration studies,
forecasting methods, and technology issues (see [8], [32],
[33], [34], [35]). In the specific context of the incorporation
of renewable energy in a market, the results of [37], [38],
[39], [40], [41], [42] are more pertinent, all of which deal
with a perturbed market due to RER. In these papers, a
stochastic framework is used to capture both overestimation
and underestimation of available wind power on the optimal
expected profit of wind power producer, the overall market
efficiency, and the overall operation cost. In this paper, we
utilize a deterministic version of the the model developed in
[41] and analyze the perturbed market and quantify the effect
of wind uncertainty on the market equilibrium.
In recent years, there is a significant interest in Demand
Response, a concept that allows the electricity demand to
response to fluctuations in the electricity price [37], [43]. One
way to reduce wind integration costs is to introduce demand
response in the form of time-variant retail electricity rate, such
as real-time pricing (RTP). RTP can potentially reduce wind
integration and forecast error costs, since consumer demand
could be made to follow the supply of wind generation by
using a price signal. Under RTP, if available wind generation is
less than forecast, the high cost of deploying ancillary services
to cover the generation shortfall can reduce electricity demand
and the cost of serving the load [30]. Similarly, because wind
generation has zero marginal cost, electricity demand may
increase when there is more wind resource available than
forecast.
In this paper, we discuss the equilibrium of an electric
energy market in the presence of renewable energy sources
and demand response. Starting from the framework proposed
in [14], we use the approach based on linear complementarity
problem to delineate the underlying market model. Repre-
senting the effect of forecast errors in renewable energy as
an uncertain parameter, we evaluate its effect on the market
equilibrium. In a similar manner, focusing on RTP as the
means by which demand response is realized, and representing
the effect of RTP as a parametric curtailment on the demand,
the effect of this parameter on the overall market equilib-
rium is also studied. A comprehensive market framework
is introduced in order to evaluate these uncertainty effects.
This market framework consists of three main participants,
generating companies including renewable energy sources,
consumer companies that are capable of responding to market
changes, and independent system operators (ISO) who clear
the market by maximizing social welfare [14] and [44]. The
overall market equilibrium is first evaluated in the absence of
uncertainties due to either forecast errors in renewable energy
sources or due to demand response, and sufficient conditions
for the proposed market equilibrium to be identical to the Nash
equilibrium is established. The market response in the presence
of uncertainties, and in particular, the market equilibrium is
analyzed using perturbation analysis. A parametric charac-
terization of the equilibrium shift is delineated. In both the
nominal and perturbed markets, the equilibriums are derived
using KKT conditions We next define formally the closeness
of two strategic game and relate the equilibrium of close games
using the notion of α − approximation and  − equilibrium.
IEEE 30-bus system is used to evaluate the results of both
uncertainties in renewable energy and in demand curtailment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In
Section II we present the necessary preliminaries, Section III
describes the model of the three market participants. In Section
IV, the overall market equilibrium under nominal conditions
is formulated. A perturbation analysis is introduced in Section
V to address the effects due to uncertainty, and the resulting
effects are summarized. In Section VI numerical simulation
results are reported. Section VII includes concluding remarks.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we provide some preliminaries related to the
wholesale energy market structure. These include the funda-
mental theorems of convex optimization which are presented
in Sections II-A. Given the close relationship between convex
optimization and Game theory, we present in Section II-B
related definitions and theorems related to game theory and
Nash equilibrium. In particular, the link between the convex
optimization problem and uniqueness of the Pure Strategy
Nash Equilibrium is presented including sufficient conditions
for the latter. These in turn are directly used in establishing the
equilibrium of the wholesale market in Section III. We start
with a few basic definitions.
Definition 1: A set K ⊆ R is convex if for any two points
x, y ∈ K,
αx+ (1− α)y ∈ K, ∀x, y ∈ K and α ∈ [0, 1]. (1)
Definition 2: Given a convex set K ⊆ R and a function
f(x) : K → R; f is said to be a convex function on K if,
∀x, y ∈ K and α ∈ (0, 1),
f(αx+ (1− α)y) ≤ αf(x) + (1− α)f(y), (2)
Furthermore, a function f(x) is concave over a convex set if
and only if the function −f(x) is a convex function over the
set.
Definition 3: Given a scalar-valued function f(x) : Rn →
R we use the notation ∇f(x) to denote the gradient vector of
f(x) at point x, i.e.,
∇f(x) =
[
∂f(x)
∂x1
, ..., ∂f(x)∂xn
]T
. (3)
Definition 4: Given a scalar-valued function f(x) :∏I
i=1Rmi → R we use the notation ∇if(x) to denote the
gradient vector of f(x) with respect to xi at point x, i.e.,
∇if(x) =
[
∂f(x)
∂x1i
, ..., ∂f(x)
∂x
mi
i
]T
. (4)
A. Convex Optimization
Consider a generic optimization problem
Maximize f(x)
s.t. gn(x) = 0, ∀n = 1, . . . , N
N∑
n=1
Rmnhn(x) ≥ cm, ∀m = 1, . . . L
(5)
where f(x) is called the objective function or cost function,
R is a matrix of constants and cm are constants. We assume
that f(x) : Rn → R is a convex function to be maximized
over the variable x, the functions gn(x) as equality constraints
are affine, and the functions hn(x) as inequality constraints
are cocave. With these assumptions the optimization problem
(5) is termed a convex optimization problem. In addition, the
constraint set for the optimization problem is convex which
allows us to use the method of Lagrange multipliers and the
Karush Kuhn Tucker (KKT) theorem which we state below
[27], [28].
Theorem 1: Consider the optimization formulated in (5),
where f(x) is a convex function, gn(x) are affine functions,
and hn(x) are cocave functions. Let x∗ be a feasible point, i.e.
a point that satisfies all the constraints. Suppose there exists
constants λn and µm ≥ 0 such that
∇f(x∗) +
N∑
n=1
λn∇gn(x∗)+
L∑
m=1
µm(Rmn∇hn(x∗)− cm) = 0 ∀n = 1...N
µm(Rmnhn(x
∗)− cm) = 0 ,∀m = 1, . . . , L
(6)
then x∗ is a global maximum. If f(x) is strictly concave then
x∗ is also the unique global maximum.
Proof: see [28].
B. Game Theory and NASH Equilibrium
An alternative game-theoretic approach can be used to
describe the market equilibrium [51], [52]. To describe a game,
there are four things to consider: 1) the players, 2) the rules
of the game, 3) the outcomes and 4) the payoffs and the
preferences (utility functions) of the players. A player plays
a game through actions. An action is a choice or election
that a player takes, according to his (or her) own strategy.
Since a game sets a framework of strategic interdependence,
a participant should be able to have enough information about
its own and other players’ past actions. This is called the
information set. A strategy is a rule that tells the player which
action(s) it should take, according to its own information set
at any particular stage of a game. Finally, a payoff function
expresses the utility that a player obtains given a strategy
profile for all players. More formally a strategic form game is
defined as follows.
Definition 5: A strategic forms game is a triplet
〈I, (Si)i∈I , (ui)i∈I〉 such that I is a finite set of players ,
i.e. I = {1, ..., I}, Si is the set of available actions for player
i, si ∈ Si is an action for player i, and finally ui : S → R is
the payoff function of player i where S =
∏
i Si is the set of
all action profiles.
In addition, we use the notation s−i = [sj ]j 6=i as a vector of
actions for all players except i, S−i =
∏
j 6=i Sj as the set of all
action profiles for all players except i, and finally (si, s−i) ∈ S
denoted a strategy profile of the game. Informally, a set of
strategies is a Nash equilibrium if no player can not do better
by unilaterally changing his or her strategy.
Definition 6: A Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium of a strate-
gic game 〈I, (Si)i∈I , (ui)i∈I〉 is a strategy profile s∗ ∈ S such
that for all i ∈ I
ui(si, s
∗
−i) ≤ ui(s∗i , s∗−i) ∀si ∈ Si. (7)
Definition 7: Let us assume that for player i ∈ I, the
strategy set Si is given by
Si = {xi ∈ Rm|hi(xi) ≥ 0} (8)
where hi : Rmi → R is a concave function and the set of
strategy profiles S =
∏I
i=1 Si ⊂
∏I
i=1Rmi is a convex set.
The payoff functions (u1, ..., uI) are said to be diagonally
strictly concave for x ∈ S if for every x∗, xˆ ∈ S, we have
(xˆ− x∗)T∇u(x∗) + (x∗ − xˆ)T∇u(xˆ) > 0. (9)
In the current context, the optimization problem in (5) can
be viewed as a game played by all player i ∈ I, and so that
together they can arrive at a Nash equilibrium that satisfies the
condition (6) in theorem 1.
We now present a theorem that links the equilibrium point
of the convex optimization problem in (5) to Nash equilibrium
using the above definitions.
Theorem 2: Consider a strategic form game
〈I, (Si)i∈I , (ui)i∈I〉 with Si as in Definition 7. Assume that
the symmetric matrix (U(x) + UT (x)) is negative definite
for all x ∈ S, where the matrix U(x) is the Jacobian of
the gradient vector of u(x), i.e. the jth column of U(x) is
∂u(x)/∂xj , j = 1, ..., I . Then the game has a unique pure
strategy Nash equilibrium identical to the optimal solution
x∗ ∈∏Ii=1Rmi of the following optimization problem
max
yi∈Rmi
ui(yi, x
∗
−i)
s.t. hi(xi) ≥ 0. (10)
Proof: From Theorem 6 in [29] we have that if U(x) +
UT (x) is negative definite for all x ∈ S, then the payoff
functions (u1, ..., uI) are diagonally strictly concave. This in
turn, using Theorem 2 in [29], implies that there is a unique
pure strategy Nash equilibrium that is identical to the optimal
solution x∗ ∈ ∏Ii=1Rmi of the convex optimization problem
in (10).
III. MODELING OF MARKET AGENT BEHAVIOR
In this section, we derive the model of the overall electricity
market. The main components of this market include (i) Gener-
ating Companies (GenCo) (ii) Consumer Companies (ConCo)
(iii) Independent System Operator (ISO) [14]. We focus our
attention in this paper on the wholesale market, and use
a deterministic framework to represent all components. The
underlying problem that is to be addressed is the determination
of the power production of the generating units and the power
demanded by the consumers such that power is balanced at
all network nodes and social welfare is maximized while
meeting capacity limits. This is a fairly complex optimization
problem since each of the components (i)-(iii) are subjected
to constraints that may conflict with each other. For instance,
consumers are interested in maximizing their benefit, and are
therefore interested in cheap electricity. Availability of such
cheap generation is limited due to capacity constraints on
transmission lines. In this case, the ISO may need to force
more expensive units to keep things in equilibrium. The solu-
tion of the resulting optimization problem not only determines
the optimal dispatch but also the optimal Local Marginal
Price which is determined as the corresponding shadow price.
In what follows, we model each of the components (i)-(iii)
together with their constraints and the optimization goals.
A. Generating Company
It is assumed that the generating company consists of NG
generating units, and that the production of each generating
unit i, i = 1, . . . , NG is divided into b power blocks, where
b = 1, . . . , NGi , and is denoted as PGib. The associated linear
operating cost is denoted as λCGib . The goal of the company
is to maximize its overall profit, and is stated as
maximize
∑
i∈Gf
NGi∑
b=1
(
ρn(i) − λCGib
)
PGib (11)
where ρn(i) denotes the LMP of unit i at node n in the
network. The power production is subject to the following
constraints:
NGi∑
b=1
PGib ≤ PmaxGi : αi;∀i ∈ Gf (12a)
PGib ≤ PmaxGib : φib;∀i ∈ Gf ; b = 1, . . . , NGi (12b)
PGib ≥ 0;∀i ∈ Gf ; b = 1, . . . , NGi (12c)
where αi and φib are the corresponding shadow prices. The
decision variables of this problem are the amounts of power
PGib to be generated by each unit i in each block b. While
ρn(i) are variables in the overall OPF problem, they can be
viewed as fixed values with respect to the optimization of (11).
Necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimization of
(11) subject to (12a) - (12c) are enumerated below, using dual
variables αi and φib, which correspond to the KKT conditions
[14]
PGib
(− ρn(i) + λCGib + αi + φib) = 0 ∀i ∈ Gf ; (13a)
b = 1, . . . , NGi
αi
(− NGi∑
b=1
PGib + P
max
Gi
)
= 0;∀i ∈ Gf (13b)
φib
(
PmaxGib − PGib
)
= 0;∀i ∈ Gf ; b = 1, . . . , NGi (13c)
Definition 8: GenCo i is said to behave rationally if the as-
sociated linear operating cost denoted as λCGib is nondecreasing
with respect to PGib . That is
d(λCGib)/d(PGib) > 0, ∀i ∈ Gf , b = 1, . . . , NGi. (14)
B. Consumer Modeling
A consumer company (ConCo) is assumed to consist of
ND units, and the demand of each unit j, j = 1, . . . , ND,
is divided into several blocks NDj , with a block-index k =
1, . . . , NDj . The associated linear utility function is denoted
as λUDjk which represents the value of using electricity for
the consumer. The goal of a ConCo is to maximize the total
profit while consuming electricity. This profit, for a unit j in
block k connected to node n, is determined as the difference
between the utility λUDjk and the corresponding LMP ρn(j)
[14]. Assuming that the corresponding power consumed is
denoted as PDjk, the maximization problem can be posed as
Maximize
∑
j∈Dq
NDj∑
k=1
(
λUDjk − ρn(j)
)
PDjk (15)
As before, this is subjected to the constraints
PDjk ≤ PmaxDjk : σj ;∀j ∈ Dq; k = 1, . . . , NDj (16a)
NDj∑
k=1
PDjk ≥ PminDjk : ψjk;∀j ∈ Dq; k = 1, . . . , NDj (16b)
PDjk ≥ 0;∀j ∈ Dq; k = 1, . . . , NDj (16c)
where σj and ψjk are the corresponding dual variables for
(16a) and (16b). While the constraint (16c) is almost always
satisfied in current-day markets, this may not be the case in
micro-grid topologies. The decision variables of this problem
are PDjk, the amounts of power to be consumed by each
demand j in each block k. While ρn(j) are variables in the
overall OPF problem, they can be viewed as fixed values, as
before, with respect to the optimization of (15). Necessary
and sufficient conditions for the optimization of (15) subject
to (16a) and (16b) are enumerated below, using dual variables
σj and ψjk, which correspond to the KKT conditions [14]
PDjk
(
ρn(j) − λuDjk − σj + ψjk
)
= 0 (17a)
∀j ∈ Dq; k = 1, . . . , NDj
ψj
(NDj∑
k=1
PDjk − PminDjk
)
= 0;∀j ∈ Dq; k = 1, . . . , NDj
(17b)
σjk
(− PDjk + PmaxDjk ) = 0;∀j ∈ Dq; k = 1, . . . , NDj
(17c)
Definition 9: ConCo j is said to behave rationally if the
associated linear operating cost denoted as λuDjk is non-
increasing with respect to PDjk . That is
d(λuDjk)/d(PDjk) < 0, ∀j ∈ Dq, k = 1, . . . , NDj . (18)
C. Effect of Uncertainties and Demand Response
The most dominant impact of the introduction of distributed
energy resources is uncertainties, which can directly alter the
power generated. This in turn can affect the overall market
equilibrium as well as the corresponding LMP. We take a
first step in this direction by introducing uncertainties in the
decision variables introduced in section A. We first separate
the family of PGib into PCGib, i = 1, . . . , nC , and P
R
Glb,
l = 1, . . . , nR, where nC denotes the more conventional
dispatchable generating units, and nR denotes distributed
energy resources such as those based on wind and solar energy,
which are non-dispatchable. At each node, both conventional
generators and wind generators may be committed for pro-
duction. We assume that the wind GenCo are competitive and
that they submit their bids to the market as other conventional
GenCo, and not modeled as a negative demand. It is also
assumed that the available wind energy is overestimated which
implies that if the assumed power is not available, power can
be purchased from an alternate source or that loads can be
shed. Underestimation implies that surplus power is either
sold to adjacent utilities, or consumed through fast redispatch
and automatic gain control, or reduced through reduction of
conventional generation. This case is however not discussed
in this paper.
Using the above discussion, the objective function defined
in (11) is modified as
maximize
∑
l∈Gw
NGl∑
b=1
(
ρn(l) − λCGwlb −C
r
wlb
(∆wlb)
)
PwGlb (19)
where PwGlb is the wind power from the l
th wind generator,
and assumed to lie in the interval
[
PwGlbmin , P
w
Glbmax
]
. ∆wlb
is due to wind uncertainty, given by
∆wlb = P¯
w
Glb∆Glb (20)
where P¯wGlb is the mean wind power, and 0 < ∆Glb < 1. We
note that if there is underestimation, then ∆Glb needs to be
negative.
λCGwlb
is the marginal cost function for the lth wind generator
which is very close to zero. Finally, Crwlb(∆wlb) is a cost
incurred by committing specific generators as reserves [42],
due to the wind uncertainty ∆wlb , and is modeled as a
quadratic function
Crwlb(∆wlb) = bwlb∆wlb +
cwlb
2
∆2wlb . (21)
We define another quantity xw which represents the percentage
of wind penetration as
xw =
∑
l∈Gw
∑NGl
b=1 P
w
Glb∑
j∈Dq
∑NDj
k=1 P
max
Djk
(22)
where PmaxDjk is the maximum power demanded by consumer
j in block k defined in (16a). We note that the impact of wind
power on the market equilibrium is much smaller if xw is
small, i.e., if wind penetration is low, than if xw is large.
Yet another component that we introduce into the picture
is Demand Response [53], [9]. As for GenCo, categorizing
all ConCo units into dispatchable and non-dispatchable ones,
we consider a dispatchable load PDjk and assume that it
is affected by Demand Response and is sensitive to price
changes. This effect is modeled using a control parameter
κDjk, and denotes the response of the consumers to a change
in the Real Time Price (RTP) which occurs due to Demand
Response.
P¯Djk = PDjk
(
1− κDjk
)
0 < κDjk < 1 (23)
P¯Djk denotes the consumption incorporated with demand
responsiveness into RTP. A positive κDjk, denotes a decrease
in the ConCo consumption while a negative κDjk, denotes
an increase. In this paper, we restrict our attention to positive
κDjk since our focus is on cases where there is a shortfall in
the non-dispatchable GenCo, i.e. ∆Glb > 0. It is assumed that
κDjk is suitably calibrated to represent the effect of RTP on
the consumer behavior. Noting that this control parameter is
proportional to the elasticity factor  defined as [9]
 =
∆PDjk
PDjk
∆ρn(j)
ρn(j)
(24)
and is a measure of the consumption response to RTP changes,
we denote this control parameter, κDjk as Curtailment Factor.
In contrast to ∆Gkb, which may be unknown, curtailment
factor κDjk, is assumed to be controllable. Nevertheless, the
equilibrium as well as the LMPs are altered due to the presence
of the perturbation parameters ∆Gkb, and κDjk. In Section III,
a similar optimization procedure as above and equivalent KKT
conditions to (13a)-(13c) and (17a)-(17c) are derived, and the
dependence of the equilibrium and LMPs on the perturbation
parameters are discussed in detail.
It should be noted that the effect of RTP is modeled in this
paper in the form of κDjk.The inherent assumption here is
that the nondispatchable ConCo observes the LMP, which is
the solution of (17a)-(17c), and suitably adjusts its demand.
This adjustment is represented through the curtailment factor
κDjk and therefore the elasticity factor . Therefore, it may
be argued that the RTP is assumed to be the same as LMP in
this paper, and that the effect of RTP is modeled essentially as
a Demand Response parameter, denoted by κDjk. Further im-
provements of such a modeling of RTP and demand response
are the focus of ongoing research.
D. Independent System Operator ISO modeling
In addition to GenCo and ConCo, a competitive electricity
market also includes a coordinator which is independent of
these profit-maximization entities [46], [45], [50]. Such an
independent entity is necessary in order to maintain order in
the overall market. Denoted as Independent System Operator
(ISO), this entity is responsible for guaranteeing a non-
discriminating access for all participants to the market, and
enforces various guidelines such as maintaining transmission
capacity limits. While in practice, distinctions are made be-
tween an ISO and what is termed a Market Operator (MO)
where the latter is responsible for financial management and
the latter for overall physical supervision, in this paper we
combine the two roles into the same rubric of an ISO. The
responsibilities of the ISO are to enforce transmission capacity
limits, to maintain independence from the market participants,
to avoid discrimination against the market participants, and to
promote the efficiency of the market.
The electricity market that we consider in this paper is
wholesale and is assumed to function as follows: First, each
generating company submits the bidding stacks of each of
its units to the pool. Similarly, each consumer submits the
bidding stacks of each of its demands to the pool. Then, the
ISO clears the market using an appropriate market-clearing
procedure resulting in prices and production and consumption
schedules. The market-clearing procedure may introduce net-
work constraints, which model losses [46] and line capacity
limits [49]. In this paper we include network constraints in
the underlying market model and the resulting prices are
therefore the Locational Marginal Prices [48]. This implies
that a generating unit injecting power at a given node is paid
the locational marginal price corresponding to that node; and
conversely, a demand receiving power from a given node pays
the locational marginal price corresponding to that node. The
most dominant network constraints are due to line capacity
limits and network losses. Technical constraints cause the
power flow through any line to be limited. The power flow is
said to be congested when it approaches its maximum limit.
This constraint is explicitly included in our model below. The
second constraint is due to losses, most of which are due to the
heat loss in the power lines. For ease of exposition, such ohmic
losses are not modeled in this paper. The standard market-
clearing procedure is based on Social Welfare [46]. Denoting
this as SW , it is defined as
SW =
∑
j∈Dq
NDj∑
k=1
λBDjkPDjk −
∑
i∈Gf
NGi∑
b=1
λBGibPGib (25)
where the first and second term denote the revenue due
to surpluses stemming from bids from GenCo and ConCo,
respectively. The market-clearing procedure is then given by
Maximize SW (26)
subject to
∑
i∈θ
NGi∑
b=1
PGib −
∑
j∈ϑ
NDj∑
k=1
PDjk−∑
m∈Ω
Bnm
[
δn − δm
]
= 0; ρn∀n ∈ N (27a)
Bnm
[
δn − δm
] ≤ Pmaxnm ; γnm∀n ∈ N ;∀m ∈ Ω (27b)
The constraints (27a) and (27b) are due to power balance and
capacity limits, respectively. It can be seen that the associated
Lagrange multipliers, ρn and γnm, are indicated in each
constraint.
The underlying optimization problem of the ISO can be
therefore defined as the optimization of (26) subject to con-
straints (27a) and (27b). This problem can be restated as
the solutions of the generation power blocks levels PGib, the
demand power blocks levels PDjk, the voltage angle δn, and
dual variables ρn and γnm such that
PGib
(
λBGib − ρn(i)
)
= 0 ∀i ∈ Gf ; b = 1, . . . , NGi (28a)
PDjk
(
ρn(j) − λBDjk
)
= 0 ∀j ∈ Dq; k = 1, . . . , NDj (28b)
δn
( ∑
m∈Ω
Bnm
[
ρn − ρm
]
+∑
m∈Ω
Bnm
[
γnm − γmn
])
= 0 ∀n ∈ N (28c)
ρn
(−∑
i∈θ
NGi∑
b=1
PGib +
∑
j∈ϑ
NDj∑
k=1
PDjk+∑
m∈Ω
Bnm
[
δn − δm
])
= 0 ∀n ∈ N ; ρn > 0 (28d)
γnm
(
Pmaxnm −Bnm
[
δn − δm
])
= 0 ∀n ∈ N ;∀m ∈ Ω (28e)
The decision variables of this problem are the amounts of
power to be generated by each generating unit i in each
block b, i.e., PGib; the amounts of power to be consumed by
each demand j in each block k, i.e., PDjk and the locational
marginal prices, ρn(j). It should be noted that (28d) is arrived
at using the balance equation, which implies that the term in
the corresponding parenthesis is zero, and by multiplying this
term by ρn, which is positive.
In summary, the market model that we consider in this
paper include optimization goals of GenCo discussed in sec-
tion II-A. and formulated in eqs. (11)-(12c), optimization
goals of ConCo, (15)-(16c), and formulated in II-B, and
finally optimization of the ISO discussed in section II-D,
and formulated in eqs (25)-(27b). The combined problem
statement is the determination of an equilibrium point which
collectively optimizes all the above three market contributors.
The corresponding equilibrium point is therefore defined as
that which satisfies the following criteria:
1) maximum profit for every individual generating com-
pany
2) maximum utility for every individual consumer
3) maximum net social welfare for the ISO.
IV. MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
We now discuss the overall market equilibrium. In the
GenCo and ConCo optimization problems, given in (11)-(12c)
and (15)-(16c), respectively, the Locational Marginal Prices
appear as inputs. On the other hand, these LMPs appear in the
optimization problem of the ISO in (25)-(27b) as dual prices
corresponding to the balance equations, causing a tight link
between the three families of optimization problems, thereby
making the overall problem nontrivial.
We note that each of these three sets of optimization
problems are linear programming problems. Thus, the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions are both necessary
and sufficient for describing the optimal solutions. The op-
timality conditions of the three sets of problems result in
a Linear Complementarity Problem (LCP) which correspond
to the market equilibrium for all i ∈ Gf , b = 1, . . . , NGi,
j ∈ Dq , k = 1, . . . , NDj , n ∈ N , and m ∈ Ω as follows:
PGib
(− ρn(i) + λCGib + αi + φib) = 0 (29a)
αi
(− NGi∑
b=1
PGib + P
max
Gi
)
= 0 (29b)
φib
(
PmaxGib − PGib
)
= 0 (29c)
PDjk
(
ρn(j) − λuDjk − σj + ψjk
)
= 0 (29d)
ψj
(NDj∑
k=1
PDjk − PminDjk
)
= 0 (29e)
σjk
(− PDjk + PmaxDjk ) = 0 (29f)
PGib
(
λBGib − ρn(i)
)
= 0 (29g)
PDjk
(
ρn(j) − λBDjk
)
= 0 (29h)
δn
( ∑
m∈Ω
Bnm
[
ρn − ρm
]
+∑
m∈Ω
Bnm
[
γnm − γmn
])
= 0 (29i)
ρn
(−∑
i∈θ
NGi∑
b=1
PGib +
∑
j∈ϑ
NDj∑
k=1
PDjk+∑
m∈Ω
Bnm
[
δn − δm
])
= 0 (29j)
γnm
(
Pmaxnm −Bnm
[
δn − δm
])
= 0 (29k)
The above problem can be compactly stated as the solution
of the following LCP: Find a vector x∗ ∈ Rn that solves the
following constraints:
xT
(
Mx+ q
)
= 0
x ≥ 0
Mx+ q ≥ 0 (30)
where x ∈ Rn×1 is the variables vector and square matrix
M ∈ Rn×n and q ∈ Rn×1 contains operating costs and bids of
generators, utilities and bids of consumers, maximum and min-
imum limit of generators and consumers and also maximum
thermal limit of transmission lines (See Nomenclature for all
definitions). The corresponding solution x∗ of the underlying
LCP problem, which determines the market equilibrium and
is dependent on M and q, is denoted as
x∗ , LCP (M, q). (31)
Definition 10: A matrix M ∈ Rn×n is called a P-matrix if
its all principal minors are positive.
We now state and prove the theorem that discusses the LCP
solution.
Theorem 3: In LCP problem defined in (30), matrix M is a
P-matrix if and only if the LCP (M, q) has a unique solution
for any q ∈ Rn. Moreover, if M is a P-matrix then there is
a neighborhood M of M , such that all matrices in M are
P-matrix.
Proof: see [54].
An additional result that will prove to be useful for our
following discussions concerns the dependence of x(M, q) on
the market parameters. This is characterized in the following
theorem.
Theorem 4: [55] Matrix A is a P-matrix if and only if
(I −D +DA) is nonsingular for any diagonal matrix D =
diag(d) with 0 ≤ di ≤ 1, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Furthermore, if
x(A, q) and x(B, p) are the solution of the corresponding
LCP (A, q) and LCP (B, p) respectively, we have:
‖ x(B,P )− x(A, q) ‖
‖ x(B,P ) ‖ ≤ β(A) ‖ (A−B)x(B, p) + q − p ‖
(32)
where
β(A) = maxd∈[0,1]||(I −D +DA)−1D||. (33)
In the following theorem, the connection between market
equilibrium and Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium is presented.
Theorem 5: Assume that all GenCos and ConCos are ra-
tional players. If M is a P-matrix, then equilibrium of the
market denoted as x∗ , LCP (M, q) exists and is identical to
a unique Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium.
Proof: We prove this proposition by using contradictions.
That is, assume that GenCos and ConCos are rational, M is
a P-matrix and x∗ , LCP (M, q) is not a Pure Strategy Nash
Equilibrium. Since M is a P-matrix, then Theorem 3 implies
that x∗ , LCP (M, q) exists and is the unique maximizer of
the GenCo problem denoted in (11) - (12b), ConCo problem
denoted by (15) - (16b), and ISO problem denoted by (26) -
(27b). That is
ui(xi, x
∗
−i) ≤ ui(x∗i , x∗−i) ∀xi ∈ Si. (34)
Since GenCos and ConCos are rational, the inequalities in
(14) and (18) hold. From Theorem 2, it follows that the payoff
functions (u1, ..., uI) are diagonally strictly concave. Theorem
2, in turn, implies that the game between GenCo, ConCo, and
ISO has a unique Pure Strategy Nash equilibrium denoted as
xN
∗. Using the Nash Equilibrium definition in (7), it follows
that
ui(xi, x
∗
−i) ≤ ui(x∗Ni , x∗N−i) ∀xi ∈ Si. (35)
Since we assume that x∗ , LCP (M, q) is not a Pure Strategy
Nash Equilibrium, it implies that both x∗ and x∗N maximize the
payoffs which contradicts the uniqueness of x∗ , LCP (M, q)
and therefore completes the proof.
Remark 1: Theorem 5 provides conditions under which the
market has a unique equilibrium, i.e. no degeneracy can occur
[14] in the market if M is a P-matrix.
We now proceed to the effect of uncertainties and curtail-
ment factor on the market equilibrium.
V. PERTURBATION ANALYSIS OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
Using the results in the previous section, we now present
a perturbation bound for the equilibrium of the electrcial
market. As we discussed above, the market equilibrium is
the solution of LCP (M, q) which is denoted as x∗ and has
been explicitly defined in Eq. (30). As we discussed in Section
II.C, the wind forecast error defined in (20), parametrized by
∆Glb, and demand response defined in (23), parametrized by
κDjk, are considered as two sources of perturbations. These
two components of uncertainty can affect M and q which
explicitly in our analysis are denoted by M+∆M and q+∆q,
respectively. Therefore the underlying LCP problem under
parametric perturbation is altered as
xT ((M + ∆M)x+ (q + ∆q)) = 0
x ≥ 0
(M + ∆M)x+ (q + ∆q) ≥ 0 (36)
This in turn leads to a corresponding equilibrium
x∗∆ , LCP (M + ∆M, q + ∆q). (37)
In the rest of the paper we are looking for the maximum shift
of the equilibrium. The following definitions are useful.
Definition 11: Define non-dimensional perturbation param-
eters M and q as
||∆M || ≤ M ‖M ‖, (38)
||∆q|| ≤ q ‖ q ‖, (39)
a constant η as
η = Mβ(M) ‖M ‖, (40)
and a set M as
M : {∆M ∣∣β(M)||∆M || ≤ η} (41)
We now quantify the relation between x∗∆ in (37) and x
∗
in (31), in the following theorem.
Theorem 6: If the nominal market (30) has unique solution
and η < 1, then the perturbed market in (36) has a unique
solution x∗∆ and satisfies the following inequality
‖ x∗ − x∗∆ ‖
‖ x∗ ‖ ≤
2
1− ηβ(M) (42)
Proof: If the nominal electrical market (30) has a
unique solution according to Theorem 1, the matrix M is
P-matrix. This in turn, according to Theorem 2, implies
that (I −D +DM) is nonsingular for any diagonal matrix
D = diag(di) with 0 ≤ di ≤ 1, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. We have the
following equality(
I −D +D(M + ∆M)) = (I −D +DM) (I +M0∆M)
(43)
where
M0 = (I −D +DM)−1D. (44)
Noting the definition of β(M), it follows that
||M0∆M || ≤ β(M)||∆M || ≤ η ∀∆M ∈M (45)
Since η < 1 according to theorem 3, it follows that I+M0∆M
is nonsingular for all ∆M ∈M. We therefore conclude from
(43) that
(
I−D+D(M + ∆M)) is a P-matrix and therefore
the market in (36) has a unique solution for all ∆M ∈ M
and η < 1.
We now show that x∗∆ satisfies (42). Using (32) in Theorem
2, we have that:
‖ x∗ − x∗∆ ‖
‖ x∗ ‖ ≤ β(M + ∆M)||∆Mx
∗ + ∆q|| (46)
We rewrite the argument of β(M + ∆M) as(
I −D +D(M + ∆M))−1D =(
I +M0(∆M)
)−1
(I −D +DM)−1D (47)
Using Appendix 1 in [2], we have:
||(I +M0(∆M))−1|| ≤ 1
1− β(M)||∆M || ≤
1
1− η (48)
Taking norms on both sides of (47), we obtain that:
β(M + ∆M) ≤ 1
1− ηβ(M) (49)
Using (46) implies that:
‖ x∗ − x∗∆ ‖
‖ x∗ ‖ ≤
1
1− ηβ(M)||∆M + ∆q|| (50)
Considering the definition of ∆M and ∆q, we obtain, in turn,
‖ x∗ − x∗∆ ‖
‖ x∗ ‖ ≤
2
1− ηβ(M) (51)
where  = max{M ‖ M ‖, q ‖ q ‖} which is the desired
bound.
Remark 2: Defining µ(∆Glb, κDjk) for all l ∈ Gw, b =
1, . . . , NGi, j ∈ Dq , k = 1, . . . , NDj as
µ(∆Glb, κDjk) =
2
1− ηβ(M), (52)
Theorem 6 implies that the uncertainty in market can lead
to a maximum shift by the equilibrium of an amount
µ(∆Glb, κDjk). As this function is nonlinear, determining
an analytical relationship between µ(∆Glb, κDjk), ∆Glb and
κDjk is exceedingly difficult. As will be shown in the next
section, simulation studies show that as κDjk increases, µ
decreases. This in turn brings the perturbed equilibrium closer
to the nominal equilibrium.
A. Game theoretic Interpretations
We now evaluate the perturbed market using tools from
game theory. Consider two strategic games defined by two
profiles of utility functions as G = 〈I, (Si)i∈I , (ui)i∈I〉 and
G˜ = 〈I, (Si)i∈I , (u˜i)i∈I〉. If s∗i is a Nash equilibrium of G,
then s∗i need not be a Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium of G˜.
The equilibria of the strategic games G and G˜ may be far apart,
even if (ui)i∈I and (u˜i)i∈I are very close to each other.
Definition 12: Given  ≥ 0, a Pure Strategy Nash Equilib-
rium s∗ ∈ S is called an  − equilibrium if for all i ∈ I and
si ∈ Si,
ui(si, s
∗
−i) ≤ ui(s∗i , s∗−i) +  ∀si ∈ Si. (53)
Obviously in Definition 12, when  = 0, the  − equilibrium
is a Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in the sense of Definition
6.
The following definition formally defines the closeness of
two strategic form games.
Definition 13: Let G = 〈I, (Si)i∈I , (ui)i∈I〉 and G˜ =
〈I, (Si)i∈I , (u˜i)i∈I〉 be two strategic form games, then G˜ is
a α− approximation of G if for all i ∈ I,
|ui(s)− u˜i(s)| ≤ α ∀s ∈ S. (54)
The next proposition relates the −equilibrium of close games
as defined in 13.
Theorem 7: If G˜ = 〈I, (Si)i∈I , (u˜i)i∈I〉 is an α −
approximation to G = 〈I, (Si)i∈I , (ui)i∈I〉 and s∗ ∈ S is
an equilibrium of G˜, then s∗ ∈ S is a (2α) − equilibrium of
G.
Proof: For all i ∈ I and all si ∈ Si, we can write
ui(si, s
∗
−i)− ui(s∗i , s∗−i) = ui(si, s∗−i)− u˜i(si, s∗−i)+
u˜i(si, s
∗
−i)− u˜i(s∗i , s∗−i)+
u˜i(s
∗
i , s
∗
−i)− ui(s∗, s∗−i).
(55)
Since s∗ is a Pure Nash Equilibrium of G˜, then u˜i(si, s∗−i)−
u˜i(s
∗
i , s
∗
−i) ≤ 0. This in turn follows that
ui(si, s
∗
−i)− ui(s∗i , s∗−i) ≤ |ui(si, s∗−i)− u˜i(si, s∗−i)|+
|u˜i(s∗i , s∗−i)− ui(s∗, s∗−i)|.
(56)
TABLE I
COST FUNCTIONS DATA OF GENERATORS
Name Block 1 Block 2
Size(MW ) Price($/MW ) Size(MW ) Price($/MW )
Pg1 12.5 240 40 900
Pg2 12.7 300 40 950
Pg5 12.2 240 80 1200
Pg11 12.2 240 80 1200
Pg13 10 40 20 80
Using Definitions 13 and 12, it follows that
ui(si, s
∗
−i)− ui(s∗i , s∗−i) ≤ 2α (57)
which in turn implies that s∗ ∈ S is an (2α)− equilibrium of
G.
Proposition 1: Assume that the perturbed market denoted
by the strategic game G˜ under uncertainties ∆Glb and κDjk
is an α− approximation of the nominal market denoted by G.
If x∗∆ is an equilibrium of the perturbed market G˜, then x
∗
∆
is an (2α)− equilibrium of the nominal market G.
Remark 3: If the wind forecast error ∆Glb increases, from
Definition 13, it follows that α will increase as the relative
payoffs of the corresponding generators will have an increased
error. Proposition 1 implies that in such a case, the equilibrium
of the perturbed game G˜ is correspondingly far away from
the nominal market G. It should be noted that as the forecast
error increases, the corresponding cost of deploying ancillary
services increases as well. If a Demand Response program is in
place, this cost increase is conveyed to the consumer, leading
to a decrease in the load quantified by the demand curtail factor
κDjk as in (23). Similar to our observation in Remark 2, it
should be noted that the exact impact of an increasing κDjk
on α is difficult to quantify due to its nonlinearity. However,
simulation studies show, as discussed in Section VI, that as
κDjk increases, α decreases. This in turn brings the perturbed
equilibrium closer to the nominal equilibrium.
VI. CASE STUDY
An IEEE 30-bus case is used for simulation studies, whose
interconnections are shown in Figure 1. The size and price
of each block of each GenCo are shown in Table I and for
the sake of simplicity we assume that each GenCo bids in
its marginal cost. The size of minimum power requirement of
each demand and the size and price of each block of each
demand are shown in Table II. We assume that only part of
the overall loads are participating in the market, and the fixed
loads in other buses are shown in Table III. The reactance Bnm
of the line connecting bus n and bus m can be found in Table
IV. The transmission capacity limit of all lines is chosen to
be 100MW . The line parameters are perunit with three-phase
base of 230 kV and 10 MVA.
A. Nominal Market Equilibrium
Table V provides equilibrium results concerning generator
output, revenue, and profit for the electric power market if
no wind shortfalls are imposed to the system. These results
are obtained by directly solving LCP problem (29a)-(29k).
TABLE II
COST FUNCTIONS DATA OF CONSUMERS
Name Block 1 Block 2
Size(MW ) Price($/MW ) Size(MW ) Price($/MW )
Pd7 11 150 19 600
Pd15 10 100 21 600
Pd30 12 170 22 600
Pd9 12 150 24 600
Pd26 15.5 150 21 600
Pd27 9.5 150 22 600
TABLE III
FIXED LOAD DATA
Name Demand Name Demand
Pd3 22.31 Pd14 7.20
Pd4 8.83 Pd16 4.06
Pd8 13.95 Pd17 10.46
Pd10 6.74 Pd18 3.72
Pd12 13.01 Pd19 11.04
Pd20 2.55 Pd21 3.39
Pd23 22.31 Pd24 10.11
Pd26 4.06 Pd29 2.78
Table VI shows the power consumed and the corresponding
demand payments. Since we ignore losses in this study, the
difference between the total generator power output and the
total power consumed, and are equal to zero and both are
221MW whereas 151MW of the load is a fixed demand as
can be seen in Table III. The Locational Marginal Price in all
of the buses is 23.62$/MWh due to the fact that transmission
lines are not congested.
TABLE IV
TRANSMISSION LINES REACTANCE; LINE REACTANCES ARE PERUNITED
BASED ON 100MW
Connected
Reactance
Connected
ReactanceBus Bus
Bus Bus (xb k) Bus Bus (xb k)
b k b k
1 2 0.0575 1 3 0.1652
2 4 0.1737 3 4 0.0379
2 5 0.1983 2 6 0.1763
4 6 0.0414 5 7 0.116
6 7 0.082 6 8 0.042
6 9 0.208 6 10 0.556
9 11 0.208 9 10 0.11
4 12 0.256 12 13 0.14
12 14 0.2559 12 15 0.1304
12 16 0.1987 14 15 0.1997
16 17 0.1923 15 18 0.2185
18 19 0.1292 19 20 0.068
10 20 0.209 10 17 0.0845
10 21 0.0749 10 22 0.1499
21 22 0.0236 15 23 0.202
22 24 0.179 23 24 0.27
24 25 0.3292 25 26 0.38
25 27 0.2087 28 27 0.396
27 29 0.4153 27 30 0.6027
29 30 0.4533 8 28 0.2
6 28 0.0599
Fig. 1. IEEE 30-bus case study
TABLE V
RESULTS OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM FOR GENCO, NO WIND UNCERTAINTY
Name Power outputMW Revenues$/h Cost$/h Total Profit$/h
Pg1 30 708.6 660 48.6
Pg2 11.64 274.93 274.76 0.18
Pg5 80 1889.6 1000 889.6
Pg11 80 1889.6 1000 889.6
Pg13 20 472.4 8 464.4
B. Perturbed Market Equilibrium with Wind Uncertainty
We assumed that GenCo at bus 13 in figure 2, is wind
based and is subjected to an uncertainty ∆G13. For the sake
of simplicity in simulations we assume that uncertainty for all
blocks are the same and characterized by ∆G13. The resulting
perturbed market, discussed in Section V, was simulated.
Figure 2 shows the corresponding market equilibrium shift
µ(∆Glb, κDjk) as define in (52) for different wind penetration.
As can be seen in Fig 2, with increasing ∆G13, higher
equilibrium shift µ results. As wind penetration xw% defined
in (22) increases, the corresponding market equilibrium shift
TABLE VI
RESULTS OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM FOR CONCO, NO WIND UNCERTAINTY
Name Power consumed Total Payment $/h
Pd7 11 259.82
Pd15 12 283.44
Pd30 10 236.2
Pd9 15.5 366.1
Pd26 9.5 224.4
Pd27 12.0 283.44
Fig. 2. Market equilibrium shift as a function of uncertainty and wind
penetration
Fig. 3. Market equilibrium shift as a function of uncertainty and demand
curtailment factor
deviation is higher.
C. Measure of Uncertainty incorporating Wind Uncertainty
With Demand Response
We now introduce a perturbation κD15 into the picture
to represent demand response which correspond to introduce
Real Time Pricing (RTP) at the consumer at bus 15. We now
numerically evaluate the effect of this perturbation parameter.
In particular, we evaluate the equilibrium shift µ(∆Glb, κDjk),
for a range of κD15 at different level of wind forecast error in
∆G13. Figure 3 shows the corresponding results, which clearly
demonstrate that RTP can reduce the equilibrium shift and
therefore the cost of uncertainty in the presence of a wind
forecast error.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The current energy crisis has created an urgent need in
integrating renewable energy resources into the power grid.
The latter in turn can introduce intermittency and uncertainty
into the picture, thereby introducing a prohibitive integration
cost. In this paper, we introduce an analytical framework
to evaluate this cost. We begin with an overall model of
the energy market including Generators Company, Consumers
Company as well as Independent System Operator (ISO).
We analyze the underlying market equilibrium using game
theory and established sufficient conditions are derived for the
existence of a unique Pure Nash Equilibrium for the nominal
market, then the effect of uncertainty due to renewable energy
on this equilibrium using perturbation analysis. The perturbed
market is analyzed using the concept of closeness of two
strategic games and the equilibria of close games using the
notion of α−approximation and −equilibrium. This analysis
is used to quantify the effect of uncertainty of RERs and its
possible mitigation using Demand Response in the form of real
time pricing, we quantify its effect on the market equilibrium
using a parameter denoted as Curtailment Factor. We show
that the equilibrium shift caused by the RER uncertainty is
mitigated in the presence of RTP due to the Curtailment Factor.
Numerical results are included that validate the theoretical
results, using an IEEE 30-bus network.
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